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Abstract
We extend the lifecycle model (LCM) of consumption over a random horizon (a.k.a. the Yaari model) to a world
in which (i.) the force of mortality obeys a diffusion process as opposed to being deterministic, and (ii.) a consumer
can adapt their consumption strategy to new information about their mortality rate (a.k.a. health status) as it becomes
available. In particular, we derive the optimal consumption rate and focus on the impact of mortality rate uncertainty
vs. simple lifetime uncertainty – assuming the actuarial survival curves are initially identical – in the retirement phase
where this risk plays a greater role.
In addition to deriving and numerically solving the PDE for the optimal consumption rate, our main general result
is that when utility preferences are logarithmic the initial consumption rates are identical. But, in a CRRA framework
in which the coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater (smaller) than one, the consumption rate is higher (lower)
and a stochastic force of mortality does make a difference.
That said, numerical experiments indicate that even for non-logarithmic preferences, the stochastic mortality ef-
fect is relatively minor from the individual’s perspective. Our results should be relevant to researchers interested in
calibrating the lifecycle model as well as those who provide normative guidance (a.k.a. financial advice) to retirees.
Keywords: lifecycle consumption, stochastic mortality, survival curve matching, JEL codes: E21/G22, Subject
Category: ??, Insurance Branch Category: ??
1. Introduction and Motivation
The lifecycle model (LCM) of savings and consump-
tion – originally postulated by Fisher (1930) and re-
fined by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), Modigliani
(1986) – is at the core of most multi period asset pricing
and allocation models, as well as the foundation of mi-
croeconomic consumer behavior. The original formu-
lation – for example Ramsey (1928) and Phelps (1962)
– assumed a deterministic horizon. But, in a seminal
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contribution, the LCM was extended by Yaari (1964,
1965) to a stochastic lifetime, which eventually led to
the models of Merton (1971), Richard (1975) and hun-
dreds of subsequent papers on asset allocation over the
human lifecycle.
The conceptual under-pinning of the LCM is the in-
tuitive notion of consumption smoothing whereby (ra-
tional) individuals seek to minimize disruptions to their
standard of living over their entire life. They plan a con-
sumption profile that is continuous, equating marginal
utility at all points, based on the assumption of a con-
cave utility function. See the recent (and very accessi-
ble) article by Kotlikoff (2008) in which this concept is
explained in a non-technical way.
Once again, until the seminal contribution by Yaari
(1964, 1965), the LCM was employed by economists in
an idealized world in which death occurred with prob-
ability one at some terminal horizon. Menahem Yaari
introduced lifetime uncertainty into the lifecycle model,
in addition to – his more widely known contribution of
– introducing actuarial notes and annuities into optimal
consumption theory.
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In the expressions (and theorems) he derived for the
optimal consumption function, Yaari (1965) assumed a
very general force of mortality for the remaining life-
time random variable, without specifying a particular
law. His results would obviously include a constant
force of mortality (i.e. exponential remaining lifetime)
as well as Gompertz-Makeham (GM) mortality, and
other commonly formulated approximations. Yaari pro-
vided a rigorous foundation for Irving Fisher’s claim
that lifetime uncertainty effectively increases consump-
tion impatience and is akin to behavior under higher
subjective discount rates. Mathematically, the mortal-
ity rate was added to the subjective discount rate.
That said, most of the empirical or prescriptive pa-
pers in the LCM literature have not gone beyond assum-
ing the GM law – or some related deterministic func-
tion – for calibration purposes. In other words, mortal-
ity is just a substitute for subjective discount rates. In
fact, one is hard-pressed to differentiate high levels of
longevity and mortality risk aversion from weak pref-
erences for consumption today vs. the future, i.e. pa-
tience. Some have labeled this risk neutrality with re-
spect to lifetime uncertainty.
For example: Levhari and Mirman (1977), Davies
(1981), Deaton (1991), Leung (1994), Butler
(2001), Bodie et al. (2004), Dybvig and Liu (2005),
Kingston and Thorp (2005), Babbel and Merrill
(2006), Park (2006), Wallmeier and Zainhofer (2007),
Feigenbaum (2008), or the recent work by Lachance
(2012) – all assume a deterministic force of mortality.
Indeed, some economists continue (surprisingly) to
ignore mortality alltogether, for example the recent re-
view by Attanasio and Weber (2010). Perhaps this is
because when the force of mortality is deterministic, it
can be added to the subjective discount rate without any
impact on the mathematical structure of the problem.
To our knowledge, the only authors within the fi-
nancial economics literature that have considered the
possibility of non-constant mortality rates in a life-
cycle model are Cocco and Gomes (2009), although
their Lee-Carter mortality model is not quite stochas-
tic as in Milevsky and Promislow (2001), Dahl (2004),
Cairns et al. (2006), or the various models described in
the the book by Pitacco et al. (2008), or the concerns
expressed by Norberg (2010).
Moreover, a number of very recent papers – for exam-
ple Menoncin (2008), Stevens (2009) and Post (2010)
– have examined the implications of (truly) stochastic
mortality rates on the demand and pricing of certainly
annuity products, but have not derived the impact of
stochasticity on optimal consumption alone or exam-
ined the impact of pure uncertainty in the mortality rate.
Another related paper is Bommier and Villeneuve
(2012) who examine the impact of relaxing the assump-
tion of additively separable utility and what-they-call
risk neutrality with respect to life duration. But, they
also assume a deterministic force of moratlity in their
formulation and examples. In that sense, our work is
similar because we also relax the so-called risk neutral-
ity and the intertemportal additivity.
In sum, to our knowledge, none of the existing pa-
pers within the LCM literature have assumed a stochas-
tic force of mortality – which is the model of choice in
the current actuarial and insurance literature – and then
derived its impact on pure consumption behavior. We
believe this to be a foundational question, and in this
paper our objective is straightforward, namely, to com-
pare the impact of stochastic vs. deterministic mortality
rates on the optimal consumption rate.
1.1. A Proper Comparison
Assume that two hypothetical retirees – i.e. con-
sumers who are not expecting any future labour in-
come – approach a financial economist for guidance on
how they should spend their accumulated financial cap-
ital over their remaining lifetime; a time horizon they
both acknowledge is stochastic. Assume both retirees
have time-separable and rational preferences and seek
to maximize discounted utility of lifetime consump-
tion under the same elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution (1/γ), the same subjective discount rate (ρ) and
the same initial financial capital constraint (F0). They
have no declared bequest motives and – for whatever
reason – neither are willing (or able) to invest in any-
thing other than a risk-free asset with instantaneous re-
turn (r); which means they are not looking for guidance
on asset allocation or annuities.1 All they want is an op-
timal consumption plan (c∗(t); t ≥ 0) guiding them from
time zero (retirement) to the last possible time date of
death (t ≤ D). Most importantly, both retirees agree
they share the same probability-of-survival curve de-
noted by p(s). In other words they currently live in the
same health state and the same effective biological age.
For example, they both agree on a p(35) = 5% prob-
ability that either of them survive for 35 years and a
p(20) = 50% probability that either of them survive for
20 years, etc.
Yaari (1964, 1965) showed exactly how to solve such
a problem. He derived the Euler-Lagrange equation for
the optimal trajectory of wealth and the related con-
sumption function.
1This simplification is made purely to focus attention on the im-
pact of stochastic mortality.
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In Yaari’s model both of the above-mentioned retirees
would be told to follow identical consumption paths
until their random date of death. In fact, they would
both be guided to optimally consume c(t)∗ = F(t)/a(t),
where a(t) is a function of time only and is related to an
actuarial annuity factor. We will explain this factor in
more detail, later in the paper.
But here is the impetus for our comparison. Although
both retirees appear to have the same longevity risk as-
sessment and agree-on the survival probability curve
p(s), they have differing views about the volatility of
their health as proxied by a mortality rate volatility. In
the language of current actuarial science, the first re-
tiree (1) believes that his instantaneous force of mortal-
ity (denoted by λDfM(t)) will grow at a deterministic rate
until he eventually dies, while the second retiree (2) be-
lieves that her force of mortality (denoted by λSfM(t))
will grow at stochastic (but measurable) rate until a ran-
dom date of death. As such, the remaining lifetime ran-
dom variable for retiree 2 is doubly stochastic. While
this distinction might sound farfetched and artificial, a
growing number of researchers in the actuarial literature
are moving to such models 2, rather than the simplis-
tic mortality models traditionally used by economists.
The actuaries’ motivation in advocating for a stochastic
force of mortality, is to generate more robust pricing and
reserving for mortality-contingent claims. These studies
have all argued that SfM models better reflect the uncer-
tainty inherent in demographic projections vis a vis the
inability of insurance companies to diversify mortality
risk entirely. We ask: how do the recent actuarial mod-
els impact the individual economics of the problem?
When one thinks about it, real-life mortality rates
are indeed stochastic, capturing (unexpected) improve-
ments in medical treatment, or (unexpected) epidemics,
or even (unexpected) changes to the health status of an
individual. Rational consumers choosing to make sav-
ing and consumption decisions using models based on
deterministic mortality rates would likely agree to re-
evaluate those decisions if their views about the values
of those mortality rates change dramatically. Our thesis
is that economic decision-making can only be improved
if mortality models reflect the realistic evolution of mor-
tality rates.
We will carefully explain the mathematical distinc-
tion between deterministic and stochastic forces of mor-
tality (SfM) in Section 2 of this paper, but just to
2We appreciate and acknowledge comments made by a referee,
that models in which mortality depends on health status, which itself
is stochastic, have been used by actuaries well-before the introduction
of 21st century stochastic mortality models.
make clear here, at time zero both our hypothetical re-
tirees agree on the initial survival probability curve p(s).
However, at any future time their perceived survival
probability curves will deviate from each other depend-
ing on the realization of the mortality rate between now
and then.
Motivated by such models of mortality, in this paper
we derive the optimal consumption function for both re-
tirees; one who believes in – and operates under a –
stochastic mortality and one who does not. Stated differ-
ently, we will solve the (consumption only) Yaari (1965)
model where the optimal consumption plan is given as a
function of wealth, time and the evolving mortality rate
as a state variable. Indeed, with thousands of LCM pa-
pers in the economic literature over the last 50 years,
and the growing interest in stochastic mortality models
in the actuarial community, we believe these results will
be of interest to both communities of researchers.
Recall that in the Yaari model conditioning on the
mortality rate was redundant or unnecessary since its
evolution over time was deterministic. All one needed
was the value of wealth F(t) and time t. But, in a
stochastic mortality model, the mortality rate itself be-
comes a state variable. In this paper we show how
the uncertainty of mortality interacts with longevity risk
aversion (γ) – which is the reciprocal of the intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution – to yield an optimal con-
sumption plan. Mortality no longer functions as just a
discount rate.
To briefly preview our results, we describe the condi-
tions under which retiree 1 (deterministic mortality) will
start-off consuming more than retiree 2 (stochastic mor-
tality), as well the conditions under which retiree 1 con-
sumes less than retiree 2, and the (surprising) conditions
under which they both consume exactly the same. We
provide numerical examples under a variety of specific
mortality models and examine the magnitude of this ef-
fect.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we explain in more detail exactly how a
stochastic model of mortality differs from the more tra-
ditional (and widely used in economics) deterministic
force of mortality. In Section 3 we take the opportunity
to review the (consumption only) Yaari (1965) model
and set our notation and benchmark for the stochastic
model. In Section 4 we characterize the optimal con-
sumption function in the stochastic mortality model un-
der the most general assumptions, and prove a theorem
regarding the relationship between consumption in the
two models. In Section 5 we make some specific as-
sumptions regarding the stochastic mortality rate and il-
lustrate the magnitude of this effect, and Section 6 sum-
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marizes our main results and concludes the paper. The
appendix contains mathematical details and algorithms
that are not central to our main economic contributions.
First, we explain exactly the difference between de-
terministic and stochastic force of mortality.
2. Understanding The Force of Mortality
In most of the relevant papers in the LCM literature
over the last 45 years the force of mortality from time
zero to the last possible date of death is known with cer-
tainty. Ergo, the conditional survival probabilities over
the entire retirement horizon are known (in advance) at
time zero. So, if a 65-year-old retiree is told (by his
doctor) that he faces a 5% chance of surviving to age
100 and a 37% chance of surviving to age 90, then
by definition there is a 13.5% = (0.05/0.37) probabil-
ity of surviving to age 100, if he is still alive at age 90.
In other words, he makes consumption decisions today
that trade-off utility in different states of nature, know-
ing that if-and-when he reaches the age of 90, there will
only be a 13.5% chance he will survive to age 100. In
the language of actuarial science, the table of individual
{qx+i; i = 0, . . . , N} mortality rates is known in advance.
This is the essence of a deterministic force of mortality
and textbook life contingencies. If q65 is the retiree’s
probability of dying between age 65 and 66, while q66
is the probability of the same retiree dying between age
66 and 67, then the probability of surviving from age 65
to age 67 is (1 − q65)(1 − q66).
In stark contrast, under a stochastic force of mortal-
ity the above multiplicative relationship breaks down.
We do not know in advance how survival probabilities
will evolve. While a 65-year-old might currently face a
5% estimated probability of surviving to age 100 and a
37% chance of reaching age 90, there is absolutely no
guarantee that the conditional survival probability from
any future age, to age 100 (given the observed mortality
rates), will satisfy the ratio. At time zero there is an ex-
pectation of what the probability will be at age 90. But,
the probability itself is random. This way of thinking –
which might be new to economists – is the essence of a
stochastic force of mortality and is the impetus for our
paper.
Here it is formally. Let λ(t) denote the mortality rate
of a cohort of a population, which may be stochastic or
deterministic. Let Ft = σ{λ(q) | q ≤ t} be the filtra-
tion determined by λ. Then individuals in the popula-
tion have lifetimes of length ζ satisfying
P(ζ > s | ζ > t,F∞) = e−
∫ s
t λ(q) dq. (1)
Assume further that λ(t) is a Markov process, and define
the survival function p(t, s, λ) by
p(t, s, λ) = E
[
e−
∫ s
t
λ(q) dq | λ(t) = λ
]
. (2)
This gives the conditional probability of surviving from
time t to time s, given knowledge of the mortality rate
at time t. Therefore
P(ζ > s | ζ > t,Ft)
= E
[
e−
∫ s
t
λ(q) dq | Ft
]
= p(t, s, λ(t)). (3)
If t = 0 then we write p(s, λ) for p(0, s, λ).
Our basic problem in this paper will be to compare
optimal consumption under two models that share a
common initial value λ0 of the mortality rate, as well
as a common survival function p(t, λ0). Typically one
will be deterministic and one stochastic. When we do
actual computations, we will either choose a specific de-
terministic model and calibrate a stochastic model to it,
or conversely, we will choose a stochastic model and
calibrate the deterministic model to it. Both possibil-
ities are discussed below. It should be clear from the
context which model we are discussing. But when it
is necessary to make this distinction explicitly, we will
write λDfM(t) and λSfM(t).
2.1. Deterministic force of Mortality (DfM)
Let λ0 = λ(0) be the initial value of the mortality rate.
In the deterministic case,
p(t, λ0) = e−
∫ t
0 λ(q) dq, (4)
and we can recover λ(t) as −pt(t, λ0)/p(t, λ0), where the
t-subscript denotes the time derivative. In other words,
if we start with a concrete stochastic model, and obtain
the survival curve p(t, λ0) from it, the above formula
determines the calibration of the deterministic force of
mortality model. This approach is computationally sim-
pler, but has the disadvantage that neither the stochastic
nor deterministic model is in a simple form, familiar to
and used by practitioners. In other words, a “simple”
model for the stochastic force of mortality rates leads
to a “complicated” model for the deterministic force of
mortality, and vice versa.
When doing actual calculations we will start by as-
suming that λ(t) follows a standard Gompertz model.
The Gompertz model was introduced in 1825, but
more recently was popularized by Carrie`re (1994),
for example. Alternative models are presented in
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Gutterman and Vanderhoof (1998) and others are dis-
cussed as early as Brillinger (1961). In our case, we
use:
dλ(t) = ηλ(t) dt (5)
so λ(t) = λ0eηt. The usual form for Gompertz is λ(t) =
b−1e(x+t−m)/b, so here we are using η = 1/b and λ0 =
b−1e(x−m)/b. This model is simple, and takes advantage
of long experience calibrating the Gompertz model to
real populations.
Note that in the deterministic setting,
p(t, s, λ(t)) = e−
∫ s
t
λ(q) dq
= e−
∫ s
0 λ(q) dq/e−
∫ t
0 λ(q) dq =
p(s, λ0)
p(t, λ0) . (6)
This will typically NOT be true in the stochastic setting.
As long as we keep in mind that we are calibrating at
time 0 (i.e. to p(t, λ0) only) that should not cause prob-
lems.
Table 1 displays a typical (loosely based on U.S. uni-
sex annuitant mortality) deterministic mortality survival
probability “matrix” of values together with the corre-
sponding mortality rate at each age x, on the bottom
row. Note that these numbers were generated using a
(deterministic) Gompertz model in which m = 89.335
and b = 9.5. Indeed, given the initial probability of sur-
vival from age 65 to any age y > 65 (which is the first
column in Table 1) one can solve for the conditional
survival probability from age y to any age z > y, by di-
viding the two probability values. This is the essence of
equation (6). Alas, when mortality rates are stochastic
all numbers p(t, s, λ(t)) beyond the first column in Table
1, are unknown at time zero.
2.2. Stochastic Force of Mortality (SfM)
There are many possible stochastic models to choose
from. Starting from the models of Lee and Carter
(1992), Cairns et al. (2006) as well as Wills and Sherris
(2010), actuaries have employed a variety of specifica-
tions for the stochastic λ(t), subsequently used to price
mortality and longevity risk. In what follows in the nu-
merical examples, we adopt a lognormal mortality rate,
which is often called the Dothan model for interest rates
in the derivative pricing literature – see Dothan (1978).
Although it might seem natural to have constant drift
and diffusion coefficients, in order to calibrate to a given
deterministic model, we allow a time-dependent growth
coefficient. For most of the numerical examples pro-
vided later-on we take:
dλ(t) = µ(t)λ(t) dt + σλ(t) dB(t) (7)
where B(t) is a Brownian motion. This is obviously the
source of randomness in the stochastic force of mor-
tality. There are many ways to select (or calibrate)
a stochastic force of mortality to a particular survival
curve. The details on how to actually compute this are
provided in the second part of the appendix.
With the probability background out of the way, we
now review the (consumption only) Yaari (1965) model
which is based on a deterministic force of mortality.
3. Review of the Yaari (1965) Model
The canonical lifecycle model (LCM) with a random
date of death and assuming no bequest motive, can be
written as follows:
J = max
c
E
[ ∫ D
0
e−ρtu(c(t))1{t≤ζ}dt
]
, (8)
where ζ is the remaining lifetime satisfying Pr[ζ > t] =
p(t, λ0), defined above in Section 2. We fix a (determin-
istic) last possible time D of death, so ζ ≤ D. When
the mortality rate is deterministic one can obviously as-
sume independence between the optimal consumption
c∗(t) and the lifetime indicator variable 1{t≤ζ}, so that by
Fubini’s theorem we can re-write the value function as:
J = max
c
∫ D
0
e−ρtu(c(t))E[1{t≤ζ}]dt
= max
c
∫ D
0
e−ρtu(c(t))p(t, λ0)dt. (9)
From this perspective, there really is not any more ran-
domness in the model. This is a problem within the
calculus of variations subject to some constraints on the
function c(t). In the end, the survival probability is ab-
sorbed into the discount rate.
Let r denote the risk free interest rate. To avoid
the distractions of inflation models and assumptions,
throughout this paper we assume that r is expressed in
real (after-inflation) terms and therefore consumption
c(t) is expressed in real terms as well. The wealth (bud-
get) constraint can then be written as:
Ft(t) = rF(t) + pi0 − c(t), (10)
with boundary conditions F(0) = W > 0 and F(D) = 0.
We are using the subscript Ft to denote a first derivative
w.r.t time, and if needed Ftt for the second derivative.
The parameter pi0 denotes a constant income rate which
we include in this section for comparison with Yaari’s
model, but which in subsequent sections will be taken
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Table 1: Conditional Survival Probability: Deterministic Mortality
x = 65 x = 70 x = 75 x = 80 x = 85 x = 90 x = 95 x = 100
To Age 65 1.000
To Age 70 0.9479 1.000
To Age 75 0.8659 0.9135 1.000
To Age 80 0.7429 0.7837 0.8580 1.000
To Age 85 0.5733 0.6047 0.6620 0.7716 1.000
To Age 90 0.3696 0.3899 0.4268 0.4975 0.6447 1.000
To Age 95 0.1758 0.1855 0.2031 0.2367 0.3067 0.4757 1.000
To Age 100 0.0500 0.0527 0.0577 0.0673 0.0872 0.1353 0.2844 1.000
λ(x) 0.0081 0.0137 0.0232 0.0394 0.0667 0.1129 0.1911 0.3234
to equal zero; c(t) is the consumption rate and the con-
trol variable in our problem. In a follow-up paper we
hope to examine the impact of additional factors, such
as different interest rates for borrowing versus lending,
of the availability of actuarial notes (i.e. the case when
the interest rate is r + λ(t)).
In this paper we operate under a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) formulation for the utility function. In
principle this should mean using u¯(c), where:
u¯(c) = c
1−γ − 1
1 − γ
(11)
for γ > 0 and γ , 1, with the understanding that when
γ = 1 we define u¯(c) = ln c. This family of utilities
varies continuously with γ. The marginal utility of con-
sumption is the derivative of utility with respect to c,
which is simply
uc = c
−γ > 0. (12)
Of course, it makes no difference to our optimization
problem (and the optimal control) if we shift u¯ by an
arbitrary additive constant. So to make scaling relation-
ships easier to express, actual calculations will be car-
ried out using the equivalent utilities
u(c) = c
1−γ
1 − γ
(13)
for γ > 0 and γ , 1. When γ = 1 we take u(c) = u¯(c) =
ln c.
As a consequence of the Euler-Lagrange Theorem,
the optimal financial capital trajectory F(t) must satisfy
the following linear second-order non-homogenous dif-
ferential equation over the values for which F(t) , 0.
Ftt(t) −
(
r − ρ − λ(t)
γ
+ r
)
Ft(t)+ r
(
r − ρ − λ(t)
γ
)
F(t)
= −
(
r − ρ − λ(t)
γ
)
pi0. (14)
When the pension income rate pi0 = 0 the differen-
tial equation collapses to the homogenous case. See
Chiang (1992), for examplem for an exposition of
Euler-Lagrange equations in economics.
3.1. Explicit Solution: Gompertz Mortality
When the (deterministic) mortality rate function
obeys the (pure) Gompertz law of mortality
λ(t) = 1b exp
(
x + t − m
b
)
, (15)
the survival probability can be expressed as
p(t, λ0) = e−
∫ t
0 λ(q) dq = ebλ0(1−e
t/b). (16)
Here x denotes the age at time 0, m is called the modal
value and b is the dispersion coefficient for the Gom-
pertz model. To simplify notation let
k(t) = r − ρ − λ(t)
γ
, (17)
and recall from the budget constraint that:
c(t) = rF(t) − Ft(t) + pi0, (18)
ct(t) = rFt(t) − Ftt(t). (19)
Equation (14) can be rearranged as
Ftt(t) − rFt(t) + k(t)(rF(t) − Ft(t)) = −k(t)pi0, (20)
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which then leads to
k(t)c∗(t) − c∗t (t) = 0 (21)
The solution to this basic equation is
c∗(t) = c∗(0)e
∫ t
0 k(s)ds = c∗(0)e
∫ t
0
r−ρ−λ(s)
γ
ds
= c∗(0)e r−ργ te− 1γ
∫ t
0 λ(s) ds = c∗(0)e r−ργ t p(t, λ0)1/γ, (22)
where c∗(0) is the optimal initial consumption rate, to
be determined, which is the one free constant resulting
from equation (21). Note that when the interest rate r
is equal to the subjective discount rate ρ, and γ = 1
(i.e. log utility), the optimal consumption rate at any
age x + t is the probability of survival to that age times
the initial consumption c∗(0). However, when γ > 1,
which implies higher levels of risk aversion, the opti-
mal consumption rate will decline at a slower rate as the
retiree ages. Longevity risk aversion induces people to
behave as if they were going to live longer than deter-
mined by the actuarial mortality rates. We will explore
the impact of γ on the optimal consumption path in a
stochastic force of mortality model, later in Section 4,
which is why it’s important to focus on this here.
Mathematically one can see that (p(t, λ0))1/(γ+ε) is
greater than (p(t, λ0))1/γ for any ε > 0 since p(t, λ0) < 1
for all t. Finally, note that in the Gompertz mortality
model evaluating (p(t, λ0))1/γ for a given (x,m, b) triplet
is equivalent to evaluating p(t, λ0) under the same x, b
values, but assuming that m∗ = m + b ln γ. This then
implies that one can tilt/define a new deterministic mor-
tality rate ˆλ0 = γλ0 and derive the optimal consumption
as if the individual was risk neutral. This will be used
later in the explicit expression for F(t) and c∗(t)
Moving on to a solution for F(t), we now substi-
tute the optimal consumption solution (22) into equa-
tion (18) to arrive at yet another first-order ODE, but
this time for F(t):
Ft(t) − rF(t) − pi0 + c∗(0)e
r−ρ
γ
t p(t, λ0)1/γ = 0. (23)
Writing down the canonical solution to this equation
leads to:
F(t) = ert
(
pi0
∫ t
0
e−rsds
−c∗(0)
∫ t
0
e
r−ρ
γ
s p(s, λ0)1/γe−rsds + F(0)
)
, (24)
where F0 denotes the free initial condition from the
ODE for F(t) in equation (23). Recall that we still
haven’t specified c∗(0), the initial consumption). We
will do so (eventually) by using the terminal condition
F(D) = 0.
To represent the wealth trajectory explicitly define the
following (new) Gompertz Present Value (GPV) func-
tion
aTx (r,m, b) =
∫ T
0
p(s, λ0)e−rsds =
∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
0 (r+λ(t))dtds
=
∫ T
0
e
−
∫ s
0
(
r+ 1b e
( x−m+tb ))dtds (25)
=
bΓ(−rb, exp{ x−mb }) − bΓ(−rb, exp{ x−m+Tb })
exp{(m − x)r − exp{ x−mb }}
.
The function aTx (r,m, b) = a(t) is the age−x cost of a
life-contingent annuity that pays $1 per year continu-
ously provided the annuitant is still alive, but only until
time t = T , which corresponds to age x + T . If the in-
dividual survives beyond age (x + T ) the payout stops.
Naturally, when T = ∞ the expression collapses to a
conventional single premium income annuity (SPIA).
Note that Γ(A, B) is the incomplete Gamma function.
In other words, equation (25) is analytic and in closed-
form.
The reason for introducing the GPV is that combining
equation (24) with equation (25) leads to the (very tame
looking) expression
F(t) =
(
F(0) + pi
r
)
ert − atx(r − k,m∗, b)c∗(0)ert −
pi0
r
,
(26)
where recall that m∗ = m+b lnγ. Then, using the bound-
ary condition Fτ = 0, where τ is the wealth depletion
time, we obtain an explicit expression for the initial con-
sumption
c∗(0) = (F(0) + pi0/r) e
rτ − pi0/r
aτx(r − k,m∗, b)erτ
. (27)
3.2. Consumption Under DfM: Numerical Examples
In our numerical examples we assume an 86.6%
probability that a 65-year-old will survive to the age of
75, a 57.3% probability of reaching 85, a 36.9% prob-
ability of reaching 90, a 17.6% probability of reaching
age 95 and a 5% probability of reaching 100. These
are the values generated by the Gompertz law with
m = 89.335 and b = 9.5. To complete the param-
eter specifications required for our model, we assume
the subjective discount rate (ρ) is equal to the risk-free
rate r = 2.5% Within the context of a lifecycle model,
this implies that the optimal consumption rates would
be constant over time in the absence of longevity and
mortality uncertainty.
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We are now ready for some results. Assume a 65-
year-old with a (standardized) $100 nest egg. Initially
we allow for no pension annuity income (pi0 = 0) and
therefore all consumption must be sourced to the invest-
ment portfolio which is earning a deterministic interest
rate r = 2.5%. The financial capital F(t) must be de-
pleted at the very end of the lifecycle, which is time
D = (120 − 65) = 55 and there are no bequest motives.
So, according to equation (27), the optimal consumption
rate at retirement age 65 is $4.605 when the risk aver-
sion parameter is γ = 4 and the optimal consumption
rate is (higher) $4.121 when the risk aversion parameter
is set to (higher) γ = 8.
As the retiree ages (t > 0) he/she rationally consumes
less each year – in proportion to the survival probability
adjusted for γ. For example, in our baseline γ = 4 level
of risk aversion, the optimal consumption rate drops
from $4.605 at age 65, to $4.544 at age 70 (which is
t = 5), then $4.442 at age 75 (which is t = 10), then
$3.591 at age 90 (which is t = 25) and $2.177 at age
100 (which is t = 35), assuming the retiree is still alive.
A lower real interest rate (r) leads to a reduced optimal
consumption/spending rate. All of this can be sourced
to equation (22).
Thus, one of the important insights is that a fully ra-
tional consumer will actually spend less as they progress
through retirement. The optimizer spends more at ear-
lier ages and reduces spending with age, even if his/her
subjective discount rate (SDR) is equal to (or less than)
the real interest rate in the economy.
Intuitively the individual deals with longevity risk by
planning to reduce consumption – if that risk material-
izes – in proportion to the survival probability, linked
to their risk aversion. The Yaari (1965) model provides
a rigorous foundation to the statement by Fisher (1930)
in his book Theory of Interest (page 85): “. . . The short-
ness of life thus tends powerfully to increase the degree
of impatience or rate of time preference beyond what
it would otherwise be. . . ” and (page 90) “Everyone at
some time in his life doubtless changes his degree of im-
patience for income. . . When he gets a little older,. . . he
expects to die and he thinks: instead of piling up for the
remote future, why shouldn’t I enjoy myself during the
few years that remain?”3
3For additional (case specific) examples of the Yaari (1965) model
in action during the non-labour income retirement phase, we refer the
interested reader to Milevsky and Huang (2010) or a recent paper by
Lachance (2012).
3.3. Time-zero Consumption Ratio= Initial Withdrawal
Rate
Finally, in the very specific case when pi0 = 0 (which
implies that the wealth depletion time is τ = D) and
the subjective discount rate ρ = r, the retiree must rely
exhaustively on his/her initial wealth F0. We get
c∗(0)
F(0) =
1
aDx (r − λ0/γ,m∗, b)
(28)
We now have all the ingredients to compare with a
stochastic model. This ratio is often called the Initial
Withdrawal Rate (IWR) amongst financial practitioners
and in the retirement spending literature.
4. Optimal Consumption: General Results
In this section we obtain the most general optimal
consumption strategy for a retiree maximizing expected
discounted utility of consumption with uncertain life-
time, which will include the (consumption only) Yaari
(1965) model as a special case. Since our main focus
now is on the mortality model, at this stage we make
the additional assumption ρ = r, that is, that the subjec-
tive discount rate equals the interest rate in the economy.
Also, in contrast to the discussion in the previous sec-
tion, we assume no exogenous pension income, so that
pi0 = 0, which then precludes any borrowing. We now
assume a fixed terminal horizon T , which denotes the
last possible date of death. The mathematical formula-
tion is to find
J = max
c(s) adapted
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
0 (r+λ(q)) dqu(c(s))ds
∣∣∣∣ λ(0) = λ, F(0) = F
]
(29)
Whereas in Section 3 of this paper we used calculus of
variation techniques to derive the optimal trajectory of
wealth and the consumption function, given the inclu-
sion of mortality as a state variable we must resort to
dynamic programing techniques to obtain the optimality
conditions. Regardless of the different techniques, we
will show how the optimal consumption function col-
lapses to the Yaari (1965) model when the volatility of
mortality is zero.
Define:
J(t, λ, F) = max
c(s) adapted
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t (r+λ(q)) dqu(c(s))ds
∣∣∣∣ λ(t) = λ, F(t) = F
]
. (30)
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As in the deterministic mortality model, the wealth pro-
cess (which we shall soon see is stochastic) satisfies
dF(t) = (rF(t) − c(t))dt. Assume that there is an op-
timal control. Then for that control,
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
t
(r+λ(q)) dqu(c(s))ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= e−
∫ t
0 (r+λ(q)) dqJ(t, λ(t), F(t))
+
∫ t
0
e−
∫ s
t (r+λ(q)) dqu(c(s)) ds (31)
is a martingale. This will likewise give a super-
martingale under a general choice of c. Applying
Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain the following Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation:
sup
c
{u(c) − cJF } + Jt − (r + λ)J
+ rFJF + µ(t)λJλ + σ
2λ2
2
Jλλ = 0. (32)
If there is any possibility of confusion, we will denote
this value function JSfM(t, λ, F).
For deterministic mortality, HJB can be obtained by
sending σ → 0 with µ(t) = η, which was equal to 1/b
in the Yaari (1965) model derived in Section 3, as
sup
c
{u(c) − cJF}+ Jt−(r+λ)J+rFJF+ηλJλ = 0. (33)
Moving on to the optimal consumption plan, we solve
the HJB equation under CRRA utility as follows: let
u(c) = c
1−γ
1 − γ
, J =
F1−γ
1 − γ
a(t, λ), (34)
where the second expression results from the scaling
which follows from the first, and apply the first order
condition c∗ = J−
1
γ
F . We obtain c
∗ = Fa−
1
γ and get the
following equation for a(t, λ):
at − (rγ + λ)a + γa1−
1
γ + µ(t)λaλ + σ
2λ2
2
aλλ = 0 (35)
with boundary condition a(T, λ) = 0.
We now solve the PDE for a(t, λ), which we re-write
as:
βt+1−
(
r+
λ
γ
)
β+µ(t)λβλ+ γ − 12β σ
2λ2β2λ+
1
2
σ2λ2βλλ = 0.
(36)
for β = β(t, λ) = a(t, λ)1/γ . The boundary conditions
are β(T, λ) = 0, βλ(t,∞) = 0 and at λ = 0 we solve
βt + 1 − rβ = 0. Note that the optimal consumption rate
is c = F/β, using shorthand notation. On to the main
theorem.
4.1. Stochastic Force of Mortality: Main Theorem
Denote by cSfM(t, λ, F) the optimal consumption at
time t, given λ(t) = λ and F(t) = F, under a stochastic
force of mortality (SfM) model. Denote by cDfM(t, F)
the optimal consumption at time t, when F(t) = F, un-
der a deterministic force of mortality (DfM) model.
Theorem 1. Assume that the survival functions for the
two models agree: pSfM(t, λ0) = pDfM(t, λ0) for every
t ≥ 0, and that utility is CRRA(γ)
(a) γ > 1 =⇒ cSfM(0, λ0, F) ≥ cDfM(0, F);
(b) γ = 1 =⇒ cSfM(0, λ0, F) = cDfM(0, F);
(c) 0 < γ < 1 =⇒ cSfM(0, λ0, F) ≤ cDfM(0, F).
Proof. To see this, we change point of view, and work
exclusively with the stochastic model. So we drop
the SfM superscript, and write p = pSfM, J = JSfM,
c∗ = cSfM, λ = λSfM, etc. Within that model, we pose
two different optimization problems, depending on the
level of information available about λ(t). The value
function J(t, λ, F) solves the problem given before in
(30), where c(t) can be any suitable process adapted to
Ft. But we define a new value function J1(t, F) in which
we impose an additional constraint on c(t), namely that
it be deterministic. More precisely,
J(0, λ0, F0) = max
c(s) adapted
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
0 (r+λ(q)) dqu(c(s))ds
]
(37)
and
J1(0,F0) (38)
= max
c(s) deterministic
E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ s
0 (r+λ(q)) dqu(c(s))ds
]
= max
c(s) deterministic
∫ T
0
e−rs p(s, λ0)u(c(s))ds.
We let c∗ denote the optimal control for J, and c1 denote
the optimal control for J1.
Since every deterministic control c(t) is also adapted,
we have the basic relationship
J(0, λ0, F0) ≥ J1(0, F0). (39)
On the other hand, the above expression is exactly what
the old deterministic model would have given. That is,
J1(0, F0) = JDfM(0, F0) (40)
and c1 = cDfM.
Due to scaling, J(t, λ, F) = a(t, λ)F1−γ/(1 − γ) and
c∗(t, λ, F) = a(t, λ)−1/γF for some function a ≥ 0. Like-
wise JDfM(t, F) = a1(t)F1−γ/(1− γ) and c1 = a−1/γ1 F for
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some a1 ≥ 0. If γ > 1 then 1−γ < 0, so a(0, λ0) ≤ a1(0),
so c∗ ≥ c1 at t = 0. This shows (a). Likewise if
0 < γ < 1 then a(0, λ0) ≥ a1(0), so c∗ ≤ c1 at t = 0.
This shows (c).
Recall that when γ = 1, we have u(c) = ln c. Earlier,
when γ , 1, we had u(c) = c1−γ/(1 − γ) and could
make use of a scaling relation. In other words, if c is
optimal for F, then kc is optimal for kF, and that leads
to the expression J(t, λ, kF) = k1−γJ(t, λ, F). Or in other
words,
J(t, λ, F) = F1−γJ(t, λ, 1). (41)
With logarithmic utility, the corresponding expression
is that
J(t, λ, kF) = J(t, λ, F) + (ln k)
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) p(t, s, λ) ds. Or
in other words,
J(t, λ, F) = J(t, λ, 1) + (ln F)
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) p(t, s, λ) ds.
(42)
Likewise,
JDfM(t, F) = JDfM(t, 1) + (ln F)
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
p(s, λ0)
p(t, λ0) ds.(43)
The first order conditions in the optimization problem
then imply that
c∗ = F/
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) p(t, s, λ) ds,
cDfM = F/
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
p(s, λ0)
p(t, λ0) ds. (44)
These agree when we send t → 0, showing (b).
The theorem certainly proves that γ = 1 is a point of
indifference. The invariance of mortality volatility when
utility is logarithmic is reminiscent of similar results in
consumption theory where income negates substitution
effects. More on this later.
Note that we only use J1(0, F) above, not J1(t, F). If
we had, we would have had to be careful. The correct
definition is that
J1(t, F) = JDfM(t, F)
= max
c(s)
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
p(s, λ0)
p(t, λ0) u(c(s))ds (45)
rather than
max
c(s)
E
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(r+λ(q)) dqu(c(s))ds
]
= max
c(s)
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)E
[
p(t, s, λ(t))
]
u(c(s))ds. (46)
These quantities have connections to annuities, as sug-
gested by the fact that the optimal consumption rates
given above are, as a fraction of wealth, inverse an-
nuity prices. In particular,
∫ T
t
e−rs p(s, λ0) ds is the
(actuarial) price of a deferred annuity, purchased at
time 0 with payments starting at time t. While∫ T
t
e−rsE[p(t, s, λ(t))] ds is a forward annuity price.
That is, if at time 0 an insurance company guarantees
(a retiree) the right to buy an annuity at time t at a price
determined at time 0, then this is that price (computed
actuarially, i.e. by discounting mean cash flows).
4.2. Intuition and Relation to Known Results
How should one interpret our result? It is tempting
to view stochastic mortality as simply “more risky” that
deterministic mortality, but that is not in fact the rea-
son consumption shifts. The true explanation for our
result is that the comparison can be reinterpreted equiv-
alently as one between two different control problems,
both within the context of the stochastic hazard rate
model. Namely, a control problem in which the haz-
ard rate is observed, so one can react to changes, versus
one in which the hazard rate is not observed, so the con-
trol must be determined in advance. The utility in the
deterministic model is the same as the utility for the sec-
ond control problem (and indeed, this is the basis of our
proof). So the mere presence of stochastic hazard rates
will not cause a change in consumption; what shifts con-
sumption is the ability to react to those changes.
There are two possible reactions to that ability to ad-
just consumption. One is to shift consumption into the
future, taking advantage of the ability to adjust con-
sumption upwards later, if the hazard rate should climb
more than expected. The other reaction is to opt to con-
sume more now, in the knowledge that one can cut back
later if it seems likely that one will live longer than ex-
pected. Our message is that either reaction can be ra-
tional, and that which one is adopted depends on the
person’s risk aversion, with the switch occurring at the
point of logarithmic utility. The choice is between act-
ing more conservatively in view of the possibility one
might live longer, versus acting more aggressively in
view of one’s ability to react to changes in the hazard
rate.
There are other results in the literature where loga-
rithmic utility is a qualitative point of indifference in
behavior. An example – in a completely different con-
text – is the classical result on the equilibrium pricing of
assets derived by Lucas (1978)4. In a Lucas-type model
4We thank Thomas Davidoff for pointing out this analogy
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– under logarithmic utility preferences – the equilibrium
price of trees (or any other income producing asset for
that matter) does not depend on the projected level of
fruit output from those trees. The economic reason for
this is that there are two effects on the current equilib-
rium price, of an increase in the expected future amount
of fruit from trees. The first is the fact that at any given
marginal utility of consumption of the fruit, the higher
expected fruit production increases the attractiveness of
owning trees today, which raises the current price of a
tree. But, at the same time, the increased expected fruit
output in future periods means higher consumption and
lower marginal utility of consumption in that future pe-
riod. This effect tends to reduce the attractiveness of
owning trees today - the tree is going to pay off more in
a time when marginal utility is expected to be low – and
thus lowers the current value (and hence price) of a tree.
These two forces are the manifestation of the (pure) in-
come effect and substitution effect from the theory of
consumer choice, and their net result – i.e which actual
dominates – depends on the shape (and curvature) of the
utility function.
In the case of logarithmic utility, income and substi-
tution effects are of the same size and opposite sign so
the two forces exactly offset each other, leaving the cur-
rent price of a tree unchanged in the face of a rise in
expected future fruit output. This is (one of) the re-
sults from Lucas (1978). Although it does not appear
the same powers are at force in our stochastic mortality
model, this does illustrate that there are a number of set-
tings in which one finds that logarithmic utility (γ = 1)
is the point of indifference between two opposing con-
sumption effects.
5. Optimal Consumption: Numerical Examples
We started with a particular survival probability at
time zero, namely the Gompertz mortality curve with
parameters m = 89.335 and b = 9.5. The age x = 65
survival probabilities to any age y > x are given in Ta-
ble 1. Both hypothetical retirees agree on these num-
bers, which means that their initial mortality rate is
λ0 = (1/9.5) exp{(65 − 89.335)/9.5} = 0.008125.
Over time retiree 1 believes his mortality rate will
grow at a rate η = (1/9.5) = 0.105 263 16 per year,
while retiree 2 believes it will evolve stochastically with
a time-dependent growth rate of µ(t) and a volatility
to the authors, and we refer the interested reader to the lec-
ture notes by Christopher Caroll, available at the following web-
site: econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/public/lecturenotes,
for this particular interpretation (and derivation) of the Lucas model.
σ. The actual curve µ(t) depends on the selected pa-
rameter for volatility, since µ(t) is constrained to match
p(0, λ0). The actual process for extracting µ(t) for any
given value of σ is rather complicated (although it is not
central to our analysis) and is placed in the appendix of
this paper. With these numbers in hand – and specifi-
cally the function µ(t) for the drift of the mortality rate –
we can proceed to solve the PDEs given in equation (35)
and (36), which then lead to the desired optimal con-
sumption function and the initial portfolio withdrawal
rate at age 65.
Table 2 provides a variety of numerical examples
across different values of (mortality volatility) σ and
(risk aversion) γ, once again assuming that the retirees
are both at age x = 65 with observable mortality rate
λ0 = 0.0081. As we proved in Section 3, and discussed
above, the consumption rate is the same across all levels
of mortality volatility when γ = 1. It increases relative
to DfM when γ > 1 and decreases relative to DfM when
γ < 1. Notice the impact of stochastic mortality on op-
timal withdrawal rates is reduced as the value of risk
aversion increases. Notice how at a coefficient of rela-
tive risk aversion γ = 10, the portfolio withdrawal rates
are approximately 4.6% at all listed volatility levels.
Note that the σ values provided are rather ad hoc
and have not been estimated from any particular de-
mographic dataset. We refer the interested reader to
recent actuarial papers – such as Bauer et al. (2008) –
for an empirical discussion around the estimation of the
volatility of mortality. Our objective here is to explore
whether or not mortality volatility has a (noticeable) im-
pact on rational behavior as opposed to on insurance
pricing.
To sum up, when the coefficient of CRRA (denoted
by γ) is equal to one, and the retiree has logarithmic
utility preferences, the optimal consumption rate at time
zero is identical in both models. In other words, a retiree
who cannot adjust their consumption plan as mortality
rates evolve starts-off with the exact same consump-
tion rate as the (more knowledgeable) consumer who
can adapt to changes in mortality rates and health sta-
tus. Although the path of their respective consumption
will diverge over time – depending on the evolution of
mortality rates – initially they are the same. In contrast,
when the coefficient of CRRA is greater than one and
the retiree is more risk-averse compared to a logarithmic
utility maximizer, the initial consumption rate is higher
in the stochastic model vs. the deterministic model. In
other words, as one might expect the ability to adapt
to changes in health status and new information about
mortality rates allows the retiree to be more generous at
time zero. Finally, when the coefficient of the CRRA is
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Table 2: Optimal Retirement Portfolio Withdrawal Rates c∗(0)/F0
Mortality Volatility γ = 0.5 γ = 1.0 γ = 1.5 γ = 3 γ = 5 γ = 10
σ = 0 7.59% 6.12% 5.58% 5.02% 4.78% 4.61%
σ = 15% 7.52% 6.12% 5.60% 5.04% 4.80% 4.62%
σ = 25% 7.44% 6.12% 5.62% 5.06% 4.82% 4.63%
Notes: Retirement age 65, interest rate r = 2%, mortality λ0 = 0.0081
between one and zero, the result is reversed. The canon-
ical retiree in a stochastic mortality model will consume
less compared to their neighbor who is operating under
deterministic mortality assumptions.
Not withstanding the above results, the absolute con-
sumption rate at time zero is uniformly higher the lower
the coefficient of relative risk aversion. This is a mani-
festation of longevity risk aversion. The retiree is con-
cerned about living a long time, and therefore consumes
less today to protect themselves and self-insure con-
sumption in old age.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this article we extended the lifecycle model (LCM)
of consumption over a random-length lifecycle, to a
model in which individuals can adapt behavior to new
information about mortality rates. The lifecycle model
of saving and consumption continues to be very popu-
lar as a foundation model for decison-making amongst
financial advisors, as recently described in the mono-
graph by Bodie et al. (2008).
Yaari (1964, 1965) was the first to include lifetime
uncertainty in a Ramsey-Modigliani lifecycle model
and amongst other results, he provided a rigorous foun-
dation for Irving Fisher’s claim that lifetime uncertainty
increases consumption impatience and is akin to higher
subjective discount rates. When the mortality rate itself
is stochastic, this analogy is no longer meaningful and
– to our knowledge – the pure lifecycle model has not
been extended into the realm of 21st century models of
mortality and longevity risk.
We built this extension by assuming that (i) the in-
stantaneous force of mortality is stochastic and obeys
a diffusion process as opposed to being deterministic,
and (ii) that a utility-maximizing consumer can adapt
their consumption strategy to new information about
their mortality rate (a.k.a. current health status) as it
becomes available. Our diffusion model for the stochas-
tic force of mortality was quite general, but inspired by
(a.k.a. borrowed from) the recent literature in actuar-
ial science. We focused our modeling attention on the
retirement income stage of the LCM where health con-
siderations are likely to be more prevalent and to avoid
complications induced by wages, labor and human cap-
ital consideration.
In the first part of this paper we re-derived the opti-
mal consumption function under a deterministic force
of mortality (DfM) using techniques from the calculus
of variations. We provided a closed-form expression for
the entire consumption rate function under a Gompertz
mortality assumption. With those benchmark results in
place, we derived the optimal consumption strategy un-
der a stochastic force of mortality (SfM), by express-
ing and solving the relevant Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation. In addition to the time variable, two
state variables in the resulting PDE are current wealth
and the current mortality rate.
Retirees with (i) no bequest motives, (ii) constant rel-
ative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, and (iii) subjec-
tive discount rates equal to the interest rate are expected
to consume less as they age since they prefer to allocate
consumption into states of nature where they are most
likely to be alive. This is the conventional diminish-
ing marginal utility argument. In our model, a positive
shock to the mortality rate in the form of pleasant health
news (perhaps a cure for cancer) will reduce consump-
tion instantaneously and further than expected at time
zero. A negative shock to the mortality rate (for exam-
ple, being diagnosed with terminal cancer) will increase
consumption beyond what was expected.
Moving forward, a natural extension would be to ex-
plore the impact of stochastic investment returns as well
as mortality rates and include a strategic asset alloca-
tion dimension, a la Merton (1971). Another item on
our research agenda is to explore the optimal allocation
to health and mortality-contingent claims in a stochastic
mortality model. Recall that one of the noted results of
Yaari (1965) is that lifecycle consumers with no bequest
motives should hold all of their wealth in actuarial notes.
However, in the presence of a stochastic mortality, it is
no longer clear how an insurance company would price
pension annuities, given the systematic risk involved. In
such a model, a retiree would have to choose between
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investing wealth in a tontine pool, with corresponding
stochastic returns or purchasing a pension annuity with
a deterministic consumption flow, but possibly paying
a risk-premium for the privilege. We conjecture that
in a stochastic mortality framework, the optimal prod-
uct allocation is a mixture of participating tontines and
guaranteed annuities.
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Appendix A. Matching Time-Zero Survival Curves
The calibration of our economic model leads to an
interesting by-product problem in actuarial finance. In
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particular, in order to construct a stochastic force of
mortality that matches or fits a pre-determined Gom-
pertz survival curve – the most popular and frequently
used analytic law in this literature – one requires a log-
normal diffusion process in which the drift itself grows
even faster than exponentially over time. In this ap-
pendix we explain the mechanics of the procedure.
Given a deterministic model (Gompertz in our nu-
merical examples), we compute the time-zero survival
function p(t, λ0). We match this using a stochastic
model, by a suitable choice of parameters. This means
that at time 0 the two models deliver identical survival
probabilities. Recall that at times other than t = 0 the
comparison will no longer be meaningful, even con-
trolling for the current observed mortality rate, because
the mismatch between conditional survival probabilities
means that the two models give different views of life-
times going forward.
Let Λ(t) = e−
∫ t
0 λ(q) dq and define a pseudo-density
q(t, λ) by the formula
E[Λ(t)φ(λ(t))] =
∫ ∞
0
φ(λ)q(t, λ) dλ. (A.1)
Then p(t, λ0) =
∫ ∞
0 q(t, λ) dλ. By Itoˆ’s lemma,
φ(λ(t))Λ(t) = φ(λ0) +
∫ t
0
Λ(s)
[
µ(s)λ(s)φ′(λ(s))
+
σ2
2
λ(s)2φ′′(λ(s)) − λ(s)φ(λ(s))
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
Λ(s)µ(s)λ(s)φ′(λ(s)) dB(s). (A.2)
Take expectations and differentiate with respect to t. We
get
∫ ∞
0
φ(λ)qt(t, λ) dλ =
∫ ∞
0
[
µ(t)λφ′(λ)
+
σ2
2
λ2φ′′(λ) − λφ(λ)
]
q(t, λ) dλ (A.3)
with initial condition q(0, ·) = δλ0 . Using integration by
parts (for φ vanishing fast at 0 and ∞), we have
qt(t, λ) = −µ(t) ∂
∂λ
[
λq(t, λ)]
+
σ2
2
∂2
∂λ2
[
λ2q(t, λ)
]
− λq(t, λ). (A.4)
So if µ(t) is known for 0 ≤ t ≤ t1, then all expectations∫ ∞
0 q(t1, λ)φ(λ) dλ can be found by solving the forward
equation for q and then integrating against φ.
Let λ(1) =
∫ ∞
0 λqdλ and λ(2) =
∫ ∞
0 λ
2qdλ be the first
two moments of q(t, λ). Note that the zeroth moment is
the survival probability, so we can integrate (by parts)
the forward PDE for q and the product of λ and the for-
ward PDE and obtain the following relationships
λ(1) = −
dp
dt ,
λ(2) = µ(t)λ(1) −
dλ(1)
dt . (A.5)
Combined the two expressions, we have
µ(t) =
dλ(1)
dt + λ(2)
λ(1)
. (A.6)
Replacing µ(t) in the forward PDE for q and obtain an
integro-differential equation
qt(t, λ) = −
dλ(1)
dt + λ(2)
λ(1)
∂
∂λ
[
λq(t, λ)]
+
σ2
2
∂2
∂λ2
[
λ2q(t, λ)
]
− λq(t, λ), (A.7)
or
qt(t, λ) =
−
∂2 p
∂t2 +
∫ ∞
0 λ
2q(t, λ)dλ
∂p
∂t
∂
∂λ
[
λq(t, λ)]
+
σ2
2
∂2
∂λ2
[
λ2q(t, λ)
]
− λq(t, λ), (A.8)
which we can solve numerically with the initial condi-
tion q(0, λ) = δ(λ − λ0).
We solve the integro-differential equation for q nu-
merically first, obtain the value of µ(t). We then solve
the HJB equation for optimal consumption as before,
with the constant µ now replaced by the function µ(t) at
λ = 0.
Finally, we should record a couple of remarks about
the form of µ(t). First of all,
µ(0) = η. (A.9)
To see this, observe that pt(0, λ0) = −E[λ0Λ0] = −λ0.
So λ20 = E[λ20Λ20] = ptt(0, λ0) + λ0µ(0). But ptt(0, λ0)
can be computed explicitly, since it is Gompertz, to give
λ20 − λ0η. This implies that µ(0) = η.
Second, note that µ(t) should be increasing in σ. The
mean E[e−
∫ t
0 λ(q) dq] does not change with σ, so by con-
vexity of the exponential, the median of this quantity
must decrease as we increase the variance. In other
words, µ(t) must rise. Put another way, this expecta-
tion is driven by the possibility of relatively larger val-
ues of the exponent, ie of abnormally low values of λ.
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As σ rises, the impact of longevity risk gets more pro-
nounced, and to compensate for that the growth rate µ(t)
must also rise.
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